Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) has substantial military and economic potential. Bound by the long-term policy objective of being a technology world leader, U.S. is set to curb Chinese influence in global AI development.
Existing approach and its problem
The U.S. strategy now is to halt Chinese companies from accessing the sources for developing AI (“Strategy”). The sources include hardware, software and scientific human resources. The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”)’s Entity List blacklists companies from trading with U.S. businesses. BIS just imposed its largest fine on Seagate, for shipping hard drive disks to Huawei. Besides Google halting supplying its Android O.S. to Huawei, Microsoft Research Asia is moving its Chinese AI researchers to Canada.
Harmful long-term impact
The Strategy undeniably slows down Chinese AI development, by enabling U.S. tech companies to temporarily recoup in areas contributing to perfecting AI technologies (e.g. 5G).
Yet the Strategy could run counter to U.S. long-term goal of being a world leader, by pushing for Chinese self-sufficiency in the AI supply chain in long run. Anticipating stricter U.S. regulations regarding export of hardware and software, Chinese government would increase funding to Chinese corporations to develop their own semiconductors. Loss of U.S. scientific cooperation strengthens existing Chinese ties with other countries (e.g. Chinese-Saudi cooperation now expands to AI manufacturing technologies). The Strategy could increase other countries’ dependence on China, casting China as the AI pioneer and world leader.
Solution: AI Cooperation Framework with China (“AICFC”)
AICFC is recommended for U.S. to meet its long-term goal.
Unlike the Strategy, AICFC promotes collaboration from the sources. Using the lift of soft- and hardware bans and re-support of China-U.S. scientific collaboration as leverage, U.S. can negotiate for setting U.S.-favoured international standard of how to use AI and regulation (e.g. penalising AI use in social media as a surveillance tool outside of China).
AICFC’s first advantage is to mitigate the “Chinese threat” to U.S. AI hegemony. As U.S. is still ahead of China in terms of high-end chips and development of AI chatbots, AICFC offers U.S. better prospects in negotiating for U.S.-favoured regulations. AICFC as a strategic restraint ensures that the U.S. tech industry and its tech-oriented economy continue to benefit even after U.S.’s edge over AI ends.
The second benefit is to entrench U.S.’s AI global influence. China and U.S. are leading AI development. Other countries, especially in Middle East and Africa, would likely depend on both countries as they may lag behind in obtaining sources of AI and/or AI technology. U.S. can use the U.S.-favoured AICFC as a trade and cooperation model with other countries, improving its long-term economy.
Potential Problem
China may be unwilling to join AICFC, fearing the restraints on its potential. This could be mitigated by U.S. promises of self-restraint (e.g. allowing U.S. and China tech giants to cooperate); and extensive cooperation in other areas (e.g. lowering the bar for Chinese tech companies listing in U.S. stock exchanges) to reduce AICFC cooperation costs.
Conclusion
U.S. is advised to replace Strategy with AICFC.
